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Abstract 
 
More attention has been devoted to providing evolutionary scenarios accounting for the 
development of beliefs, or belief-like states, than for desires or preferences. Here I articulate and 
defend an evolutionary rationale for the development of psychologically real preference states. 
Preferences token or represent the expected values of discriminated states, available actions, or 
action-state pairings. The argument is an application the ‘environmental complexity thesis’ found 
in Godfrey-Smith and Sterelny, although my conclusions differ from Sterelny’s. I argue that 
tokening expected utilities can, under specified general conditions, be a powerful design solution 
to the problem of allocating the capacities of an agent in an efficient way. Preferences are for 
efficient action selection, and are a ‘fuel for success’ in the sense urged by Godfrey-Smith for true 
beliefs. They will tend to be favoured by selection when environments are complex in ways that 
matter to an organism, and when organisms have rich behavioural repertoires with heterogenous 
returns and costs. 
  
The rationale suggested here is conditional, especially on contingencies in what design options are 
available to selection and on trade-offs associated with the costs of generating and processing 
representations of value. The unqualified efficiency rationale for preferences suggests that 
organisms should represent expected utilities in a comprehensive and consistent way, but none of 
them do. In the final stages of the paper I consider some of the ways in which design trade-offs 
compromise the implementation of preferences in organisms that have them. 
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1. Introduction 
 
What are preferences for? Or, a little more narrowly, why should we expect some natural, 
biologically evolved, agents to have preferences? The heart of the answer that I’ll defend is 
that preferences enable efficient action selection,1 which is to say the deployment of the 
relatively flexible capacities of the agent in fitness-favouring ways. I use the term ‘preference’ 
to refer to a psychological or cognitive state. To have preferences is not merely to exhibit them 
in behaviour that more or less consistently maximises something, as in strictly behaviourist 
‘revealed preference theory’ (Samuelson 1938).2 Preference-revealing behaviour is relevant 
here, but my primary focus is the function and development of a psychological capacity. An 
agent that has preferences produces and processes states that somehow represent the 
expected values of local world-states or outcomes that it can detect or anticipate, or actions 
that it can perform.3 A few preliminary clarifications about what I mean by having preferences 
may be helpful. 
 
First, I’m more interested in the usefulness of having a set or a system of preferences than 
with the functionality of individual preferences. For an agent that has some system of 
preferences, it is easy enough to pick one and consider whether or when it is advantageous. 
My concern is with the question why agents might be expected to have the general capacity to 
represent some outcomes or actions as more or less valuable than others, and to focus on that 
I’ll mostly assume that the specific rankings are advantageous. 
 
Second, a natural agent can have preferences more or less completely, in the sense of covering 
all or only some of the outcomes it can distinguish or actions it can perform. (For example, a 
creature might have richly detailed preferences over what it eats, but switch between foraging 
and other activities in ways not mediated by preferences.) It can also have them more or less 
consistently in the sense that the ordering may or may not respect transitivity, be stable over 
time, or otherwise respect requirements typically found in normative theories of preference. 
For much of what follows I’ll write as though preferences are fairly well-behaved but this is 
for expository simplicity. My initial aim (§3 and §4) is to identify an ideal towards which 
selection could sometimes be expected to move were other constraints not relevant. Other 
constraints, though, are always relevant and after articulating the primary argument I spend 
some time considering them (see §5).  
 
Third, and finally, my target here, having preferences, is different from — and more modest 
than — having desires. Although there are various theories of desire to choose between, most 
                                            
1 I understand ‘action’ here in an inclusive way largely interchangeable with ‘behaviour’, and covering any 
functional allocation of the relatively short-term capacities of an organism. (See §3.) 
2 Samuelson (1938) sought to “develop the theory of consumer's behaviour freed from any vestigial traces of the 
utility concept” and although economists ended up retaining the term ’utility’ it was generally understood to be 
cognitively noncommittal. 
3 I’ll assume, but not defend, Shea’s ‘varitel semantics’ account of sub-personal representation (Shea 2018). Key 
advantages of his view include relaxing the teleosemantic requirement of determinate consumers (at best an 
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agree that desires are personal states, often conscious, that can — in partnership with beliefs — 
feature in rationalisation of intentional action. Preferences, on the other hand, are sub-
personal. They’re not paradigmatically conscious (although they might be consciously 
accessible to some agents) and to do their work they need not feature in deliberation, or 
reason-giving explanation. This means that my project of naturalistic explanation is different 
from that of Sterelny (2003) to the extent that he attempts to provide plausible evolutionary 
rationales for the development of states approximately corresponding to the folk-
psychological categories of belief and desire.4 In the sense at issue here, many non-human 
animals, including some insects and invertebrates, plausibly have preferences (see §6). 
 
There are is another set of questions about preference and evolution that I’m not directly 
concerned with here. It concerns how preferences developed in the actual history of life and 
cognition, including whether they were ‘invented’ once (like hearts) or many times (like eyes). 
I’ll say a little about these matters, mostly in (§6), but my primary aims here are to characterise 
the capacity I’m calling having preferences, and to specify fairly general conditions under 
which that capacity would be beneficial to an organism. I take it for granted for now that there 
is a genuine explanandum here: some real organisms do represent the values of some of the 
options open to them, i.e. that they have preferences. There’s room to argue over how many 
types of organism do this, as well as over what else some of them might have. Although some 
of what follows below may be relevant to human cognition and choice, I’m not directly 
concerned with humans, which raise additional complications. It’s probably better to have rats 
and insects in mind than people.  
 
2. Evolution, Cognition and Complexity 
 
The argument of the following sections is an application of a traditional approach, more 
recently articulated by Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996, 2002) under the label of the 
‘Environmental Complexity Thesis’ or ECT. This is a view about the function of cognition in 
general, and so should be expected to apply to the restricted cognitive capacity of having 
preferences. In its shortest statement, the ECT says that “…the function of cognition is to 
enable the agent to deal with environmental complexity” (2002, p225). The ECT proposes, 
that is, that organisms capable of cognition can respond more effectively to significant 
heterogeneity (‘complexity that matters’) in their environments, and that at least sometimes 
investment in these capacities can pay their way. 
 
Consider, for example, the predicament of a nesting reed-warbler, sometimes exploited by 
cuckoo brood-parasitism. The difference between an egg laid by the reed-warbler and one laid 
by a cuckoo is highly significant from an evolutionary point of view. This is a vivid example of 
                                                                                                                                    
idealisation when applied to real neural processes), and openness to a variety of etiological content stabilising 
processes. 
4 Matters are complicated by the fact that Sterelny (2003, and 2001) sometimes uses ‘desire’ and ‘preferences’ 
interchangeably. But it’s clear that he’s considering states that represent the goals of action, which is more than I 
require preferences to do (see Spurrett 2015). 
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environmental heterogeneity. Despite its importance, the difference isn’t a trivial one to detect 
because cuckoo eggs can closely resemble those of the birds they exploit. Cognitive 
mechanisms can — nobody says that they must — play a role in responding to this, for 
example by making a reed-warbler more likely to reject an egg in its nest if it has not yet laid 
any in that season itself, or if it has recently seen cuckoos nearby.5 Cognitive mechanisms can, 
that is, operate to make the contingencies in what behaviours are produced (and when) more 
appropriately sensitive to such heterogeneity in the environment as an organism can detect. 
‘Dealing with’ environmental complexity, then, is largely a matter of doing the right thing, 
from a repertoire which itself might change, at the right time, or doing so more often than 
otherwise. That is to say that Godfrey-Smith’s view shares with others, including Dennett, the 
feature that cognition functions to help answer the question implicitly faced by any organism 
able to produce behaviour or action, ‘Now what do I do?’ (Dennett 1991, p177).6 
 
In some expositions of the ECT, the design and control architecture of the organism’s body is 
taken largely for granted, and the contribution of cognition described in terms of determining 
what to do with that body given the (changing) state of the external world. In contrast some, 
including Fred Keijzer (e.g. Keijzer 2015; Keijzer, van Duijn & Lyon 2013) have argued that 
the earliest job of neurons, and at least some of what deserves to be called cognition, is in co-
ordinating the physical capacities of an organism independent of the state of the external 
world, and even in the absence of any sensory transducers. According to the ‘Skin Brain 
Thesis’ (SBT) contractile tissues pose a control problem, and almost without exception 
organisms with muscles also have neurons. The precursors of brains, Keijzer argues, arose to 
deal with making use of bodies with contractile tissues before external sense and environmental 
complexity were significant factors. 
 
The ECT and SBT are not, I think, most usefully thought of as mutually exclusive 
competitors, but rather as differences of emphasis that can be seen as special cases of a more 
general view. In recent work Godfrey-Smith and Keijzer have collaborated to sketch an 
‘option space’ for early neural evolution in just this way (Jékely, Keijzer & Godfrey-Smith 
2015). I don’t, therefore, need to take sides. In what follows the demands of controlling the 
body and the demands of dealing with the external environment, both of which can be 
complex, will feature in explaining the function and evolution of preferences. To make this 
explicit, I propose to work with the following gloss of the general function of cognition: 
 
“The function of cognition is to enable the agent to co-ordinate its (possibly complex) 
capacities, which can include co-ordinating those capacities with environmental 
complexity.” 
                                            
5 This example is used in Sterelny (2003, Chapter 2). Darwin discussed cuckoo brood parasitism in Chapter 8 of 
the Origin of Species to illustrate how natural selection might impact on behaviour. Over half of the world’s bird 
obligate brood parasites are species of cuckoo (a little under half of the species of cuckoo are brood parasites). 
Cuckoo brood parasitism evolved independently three times (Payne 2005) and there is significant variation in the 
details of the various arms races between host and parasite species. 
6 See also Dennett (1984) for an earlier discussion of the importance of ‘producing future’. 
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I think of this as a friendly amendment of the ECT, standard treatments of which might have 
said relatively little about the demands of controlling the body (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 1996, 
Sterelny 2003), focusing rather on the organisation of behaviour in relation to external 
contingencies, but which nonetheless don’t deny that these demands are important. The 
function of cognition is still dealing with complexity. I merely emphasise that some of the 
complexity might be in the agent itself. 
 
Although I argue that it makes sense that preferences would have evolved (under conditions 
to be outlined below), the case is largely agnostic between some accounts of evolutionary 
advantage. In particular I think it is a matter of taste for the reader whether she interprets this 
in terms of fitness advantage, or as a type of ‘viability explanation’ (Wouters 1995).7  
 
 
3. The Basic Efficiency Rationale for Preferences (ERP) 
 
The core of my proposal, as noted, is that preferences are for enabling efficient action 
selection. The answer to the question why preferences evolved is: 
 
(ERP1) Preferences enable efficient action selection. 
 
Before defending this claim, let me clarify how it is to be understood. ‘Action’ is any functional 
activity that the agent produces, that is any deployment of its relatively transient ‘degrees of 
freedom’, whether muscles, glands or other kind of effector, individually or in concert.8 This is 
a deliberately broad and inclusive use of ‘action’, more in keeping with practice in artificial 
intelligence than in some philosophical traditions where action is reserved for a specific class 
of intentional activity. The term behaviour is used in varied ways by psychologists, ethologists 
and others. If we restrict behaviour to cases of functional activity (Millikan 1993a, 1993b), 
action ‘action’ here is interchangeable with ‘behaviour’. I’ll use ‘activity’ to include 
deployments of degrees of freedom irrespective of whether they’re functional. Not all activity 
is action. 
 
There are few hard boundaries to be had in the ragged and gradual world of living things. Just 
as growing and reproducing may not always be strictly distinguishable, for example in the case 
of plants that send out runners, so it is for behaving and developing.9 While some plant 
activities, such as the closing of a Venus fly trap, satisfy fairly straightforward criteria for 
‘behaviour’, some recent discoveries in plant cognition focus on instances of what could be 
called discriminating development. Findings, such as that growth can be sensitive to histories 
                                            
7 Wouters argues persuasively that traits can be explained by reference to their contribution to viability, rather 
than comparative advantage. Okasha (2018) argues that it isn’t generally or necessarily true that natural selection 
will tend to optimise fitness, and concludes that justifications for adaptationism must be empirical. 
8 At least sometimes, this includes not activating some capacity. (Keeping still is a perfectly good instance of 
behaviour.) It’s also worth noting that the capacities activated need not be within the organism’s own body. 
(Phenotypes are sometimes extended.) I’ll focus mostly on within body capacities here. 
9 Godfrey-Smith (2002) contains a useful discussion of some of the difficulties here. 
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of exposure to conditions that are not themselves intrinsically beneficial or harmful, but were 
correlated with ones that were, are sometimes described in terms of ‘learning’ or 
‘conditioning’ (Gagliano et al. 2016).10 I acknowledge these difficulties, but will largely be able 
to ignore them here because the argument about the function of preferences concerns the 
paradigmatic animal actions of behavioural ecology: moving about, foraging, fighting, nesting. 
 
Given this, action selection is a placeholder for whatever it is that determines which degrees of 
freedom are activated or not, and to what extent to produce behaviour. This determination 
needn’t always be cognitive, let alone richly so. Some capacities can be quite directly triggered 
by local — external or internal — conditions, independent of what is happening with the rest 
of the organism. Saying that there is such a thing as action selection is not yet to take any view 
about how, or by what mixture of means, it is achieved. (Action selection is distinct from, 
although perhaps not independent from, action production, where production is making 
action from capacities.) 
 
Finally, action selection is efficient in proportion to goal satisfaction achieved and in inverse 
proportion to costs expended. For my purposes it doesn’t matter much how you conceive of 
the goals of an organism, as long as we’re agreed that the overall goal or goals can be pursued 
directly or via intermediate or contributing goals. So, whether you’re inclined to suppose that 
an organism has the single goal of reproductive success, or some mixture of survival and 
reproduction, or the possibly conflicted net effect of the reproductive goals of its genes, 
effective pursuit of that will involve pursuit, over smaller time-scales, of some mixture of 
calorie intake, hydration, rest, mating, avoiding being eaten by a tiger, and so forth. These 
goals needn’t, and generally won’t, be represented as goals for or in the agent, even though 
some agents might sometimes represent some of them. 
 
Greater efficiency in selecting actions given some goals is an obvious kind of advantage over 
anything with the same goals. Given similar goals and capacities, an organism that allocates 
the capacities to more efficiently achieve the goals is doing better. The presumption that 
meaningful standards of efficiency can be determined, and used to interpret observed 
behaviour, is essential to most empirical behavioural ecology. Not only that, in some areas — 
for instance foraging — living organisms have been shown to be extraordinarily efficient in 
their patterns of behaviour. To make the basic argument for (ERP1) I defend two claims. The 
first is that achieving efficient action selection can often be difficult. The second is that having 
preferences is a plausible way of dealing with these difficulties. 
 
The main reason that achieving efficient action selection can be difficult is that actions 
generally have varying (and multi-modal) costs, and varying (and multi-modal) returns. The 
costs include direct expenditure of energy, the depletion of specific ‘fuels’ or resources such as 
water and salt, as well as time spent, exposure to various risks such as predation in the course 
                                            
10 Gagliano and colleagues set up a Y-maze task, and found that a neutral cue predicting of light was associated 
with discriminating growth. 
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of the action, and the opportunity cost of forgone actions available at the same time. The 
returns can be as varied as the needs of the organism and include hydration, nutrition (itself 
potentially further varied, and sometimes including feeding dependent young), rest, access to 
mating opportunities, acquisition of nesting materials or control of a nesting site, and so forth. 
 
The detectable state of the world can indicate, to varying extents, and sometimes subject to 
the hostile deception that Sterelny (2003) says makes some environments informationally 
opaque, likely costs and returns: the visible scene might include both watering-hole and 
predator threat, for example, or no food in the immediate vicinity, but two different patches 
of green in the distance. The detectable state of the organism itself can in turn indicate what 
needs are most urgent, or what costs can be most easily sustained. Sterelny (2003) argues that 
internal environments — being parts of an agent with united and consistent interests — will 
tend to be devoid of conflict, and hence that internal signals of need and capacity will tend to 
be highly reliable. This is, I think, over-optimistic in underestimating the importance of 
internal conflict, and the complexity of the task of tracking needs and resources. On the first 
point, it’s not generally true even that the genes in a single individual have precisely the same 
interests (Haig 2002, Burt & Trivers 2006).11 In addition, almost any organism large enough is 
itself the habitat for other organisms, with their own possibly hostile interests of their own. 
Internal signals, that is, can sometimes be subject to conflict and manipulation. That aside, 
though, and turning to the second point, even honest internal signalling has to reckon with the 
complexity of tracking needs and resources. 
 
As Sterelny says, an environment is informationally translucent to organisms when states that 
matter to it “map in complex, one to many ways onto the cues they can detect” (Sterelny 
2003, p. 21). These conditions can be satisfied in hostility-free internal environments, in 
several ways. One way is because of constraints on what can easily be transduced or detected. 
Just as in the external case, not all internal states have unique signatures that cost-effective 
transducers can specialise in detecting. Non-nutritive sweeteners, for example, trigger 
transducers whose ‘proper function’ is to respond to sugars that can be digested. The 
responses of salt receptors, depending on the action of ion channels, are also sensitive to the 
ambient sodium concentration in the organism, so the resulting neural signals can be highly 
ambiguous (e.g. Bertino, Beauchamp & Engelman 1982). Another way is because 
motivationally relevant states can depend on multiple cues. Information about temperature in 
humans, for example, is drawn from multiple receptors of different types that are distributed 
non-uniformly across the surface of the body. As Akins notes, even on the human face the 
ratio of cold to warm receptors varies from about 8:1 on the nose, 4:1 on the cheeks and chin, 
while the lips have almost no cold receptors (Akins 1996, p. 346). Any ‘net’ signal that might 
drive behaviour — to seek more or less warmth — will require these signals to be integrated 
in some way. More generally, bodily states can span multiple organs and tissue types, with 
                                            
11 Both Haig and Trivers have suggested that this intragenomic conflict predicts intrapersonal conflict, a 
proposal that I assess in Spurrett (2016). 
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varying speeds of signalling, and latencies in responding to actions that affect them. In the 
language of Sterelny (2003) some internal states themselves require ‘robust tracking’.   
 
Even if internal signalling was both honest and consistently accurate, the problem of matching 
the fluctuating needs and capacities of the organism to the varying profile of opportunities 
and risks in the detectable environment can itself be complex. Doing ‘the right thing at the 
right time’ is a trade-off problem with varying and fluctuating parameters. Behaviours, as 
noted, have varying returns (in calories, specific nutrients, hydration, mating opportunities, 
acquisition of nest-building materials, etc.) all of them uncertain to varying degrees, and their 
execution carries varying costs (in calories, hydration, exposure to predation, the possible 
returns of behaviours foregone, etc.). Some decisions involve options with the same 
dimensions, for example patch switching when foraging is understood as a problem of 
comparing actions with different expected rates of calorie intake. Others involve options or 
bundles with at least some dimensions that aren’t shared, such as when choosing between 
pursuing hydration at a site with low predator risk and eating somewhere with risks and 
possible gains in social rank or mating opportunities. Making action selection efficient 
involves dealing with these many and varied mappings. 
 
The discussion so far has focused on selection between actions. But I noted earlier than action 
selection and action production need not be independent. Not only that, production involves 
efficiency problems of its own. If behaviour is functional activity (or inactivity) then not all 
activity will amount to behaviour, because some will be noise or otherwise non-functional.12 
Making functional activity out of a collection of degrees of freedom is not generally a trivial 
matter. This is so because many behaviours require multiple degrees of freedom to be co-
ordinated. They may require multiple muscles or joints to act compatibly to produce the 
behaviour, and also require that these ones aren’t thwarted by inappropriate activation of 
others not directly involved. The mappings from the many degrees of freedom in a whole 
body to what is needed to produce even simple behaviours like pecking at a stationary key can 
be highly complex. 
 
The selection of one action over another often carries an opportunity cost not merely in other 
allocations of the same degrees of freedom as are directly involved, but also in others whose 
execution have to be transiently suppressed to produce the selected one. The facts of the 
matter about what behaviours might be possible are not, furthermore, unchanging. The 
orientation of the body, and its disposition with respect to various surfaces, can determine 
whether jumping is an option (you can’t generally do that lying down), or what combination 
of muscle loading across the joints of an arm is required to put something into one’s mouth, 
or push it away.  
 
While some actions can be achieved by modulating the activity of one or a few isolated 
degrees of freedom, as in the case of blinking, or releasing fluid from a tear duct, many 
                                            
12 Functional needn’t mean ‘successful’ here. (On this I follow Millikan, e.g. 1984). 
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cannot. Consider a complex bit of animal anatomy with multiple degrees of freedom such as a 
primate forelimb with shoulder, elbow and a set of digits. Some combinations of allocations 
of the effectors, such as simultaneously flexing and relaxing the same muscle, or flexing those 
that would move a segment in one direction around a joint while not relaxing those that would 
move it in the opposite direction, are at least incompatible and could even be harmful if 
attempted with high intensity. For a movement comprising components around more than 
one joint at once, along a single limb or several — as in reaching on toe-tip for something on 
a high shelf — many such combinations of contraction and co-operative relaxation may be 
required. In many natural brains, part of this complexity is handled by means of what 
Sherrington called ‘final common paths’. He argued that upstream of the specific effectors (in 
what he called the ‘afferent arc’) competing allocations (‘reflexes’) converged in a final 
common path, where only one reflex (as opposed to some combination or sum) would gain 
control of the effectors downstream (e.g. Sherrington 1906, pp. 117-118). 
 
The general idea of a final common path is a good and useful one, but I’m not suggesting we 
be strictly Sherringtonian about them. We needn’t suppose that all final common paths are 
anatomically local, or unique (both redundancy and distribution are allowed). In addition we 
should grant that many of the patterns of activation and inhibition required for various 
behaviours are learned, and likely involve what Clark (1997) called ‘soft assembly’: control 
solutions dependent on and mediated by the structure and properties of the behaving body 
and its environment. That said, Sherrington’s insight provides a useful corrective to the 
tradition, going back at least to Brooks (1991) that regards almost any convergence in a 
control system as a symptom of allegiance to muddled models of intelligence and cognition. 
Not all bottlenecks are bad.  
 
The point I’m emphasising is that the problem of making behaviours out of combinations of 
capacities is itself one that involves trade-offs, between other possible allocations of individual 
capacities and combinations of them, over and above whatever the metabolic and other direct 
costs of this or that action might be. Motor control, that is, is not generally independent from 
the problem of selection, even if many accounts elide this by taking as their starting point the 
already selected behaviour or movement. Besides the more obvious efficiency issues relating 
to getting something done without excess noise, energy expenditure, etc., is the efficiency 
problem of competing allocations of the same capacities.  
 
I’ve argued that making action selection efficient is a trade-off problem, involving co-
ordinating the varied and multi-modal needs and capacities of the body, some of which 
constrain one another, given the also multi-modal risks and opportunities in a changing 
environment. Suppose that this is right. Then the argument that having preferences is a way of 
dealing with these difficulties can be made fairly simply. Preferences are states that attach 
values to possible actions or detectable world states. If those values are appropriately 
responsive to whatever the overall goals of the organism are, as well as its changing needs and 
opportunities, then they could be exploited to make action selection more efficient. If you 
think organisms are in the fitness business, preferences can represent expected returns in 
DRAFT VERSION – COMMENTS WELCOME 
10 
fitness, or predictors of it. Then the members of some set of available actions would be 
associated with states that reflect their relative contribution to overall goals, and the processes 
of action selection could use these states to choose better actions.13 Preferences just are 
representations of the values of actions given states (or world or organism). 
 
Preferences, that is, are situation-specific rankings of available actions. So, for example, in a 
dehydrated organism actions that likely lead to water consumption should be valued more. In 
an animal that has just detected a predator, actions from the its defensive repertoire should 
come to be valued more, and so forth. (They could also be updated in the light of experience 
of the gains and costs of actions given detectable cues, although preferences are not 
necessarily associated with learning.) And the advantage comes from having a system of them 
that is appropriately responsive to changing conditions. Making action selection efficient is a 
real problem, and having preferences is a possible solution. 
 
This shouldn’t be surprising, because venerable tradition has it that effective agents will act as 
if they assign subjective probabilities to current and future states of the world (including the 
states that may follow available actions), and select actions that maximise expected utility 
(Ramsey 1931, Savage 1954). A more contemporary version of this idea suggests that effective 
agents should implement (and evolve to implement) some form of Bayesian rationality, 
including conditionalization as a mechanism of belief updating (Okasha 2018, Chapter 6). 
 
That preferences ‘could’ enable efficient action selection is all I am after. Some argue that 
efficiency ‘must’ have recourse to preferences. Shizgal and Conover, for example, reporting on 
rat subjects that traded off mutually exclusive rewards in the form of trains of brain 
stimulation reward (BSR) and sugar solution, put it like this: 
 
“In natural settings, the goals competing for behavior are complex, multidimensional 
objects and outcomes. Yet, for orderly choice to be possible, the utility of all competing 
resources must be represented on a single, common dimension.” (Shizgal & Conover 
1996) 
Shizgal and Conover’s rats showed flexible sensitivity to the opportunity cost of foregone 
rewards, including in cases where one reward was a bundle including both BSR and sugar 
solution. Their hunch is that pulling off such tracking without preferences would be mysterious, 
or maybe — if we take the ‘must’ seriously — impossible. This is a stronger claim than I want 
to defend for now. I just need ‘having preferences’ to be a viable way of enabling more 
efficient action selection. 
 
 
                                            
13 It doesn’t matter here whether the better of two, or best of more, action is selected always, or merely more 
often. Simply doing a better thing more often than otherwise is sufficient as a notion of advantage. (A variety of 
final outcome determination processes might respond to preferences in different ways. See §6.) 
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4. The Refined ERP 
 
As defended above, the Evolutionary Rationale for Preferences is vulnerable to some 
standard objections and worries. Here I outline and briefly address the main ones. Some of 
them concern scenarios in which an organism might do without preferences, and involve 
differing views about how effective or successful such an organism might be. Others focus on 
how expensive building and operating a system of preferences might be in comparison to other 
options. It certainly isn’t the case that having preferences is the only way to deal with action 
selection. Also, no reasonable approach to efficiency can ignore the costs of the means used 
to make other processes efficient. The upshot of thinking through the objections is a qualified 
restatement of the ERP. 
 
Preferences in the sense at issue here are usefully understood as a kind of sub-personal 
representation. They are produced or modulated by systems tracking the changing needs of the 
organism, and by systems tracking the local opportunity space, in some cases also updated in 
the light of the history of consequences of actions performed in various conditions. And they 
have effects in systems arbitrating between mutually exclusive allocations of the scarce means, 
primarily bodily degrees of freedom, at the disposal of the organism. I’m not going to defend 
the claim that they’re representational here — there are competing accounts of what it is to 
represent, and conflict tangential to my purposes over whether representations are good or 
bad things at all.14 I don’t think it matters much if my representation talk is replaced with 
reference to ‘tracking’ or some other notion, as long as the tracking function is discharged. 
 
One likely objection, nonetheless, is provided by the strands of anti-representationalist 
thinking found in artificial intelligence and robotics. On those views, representations are 
unnecessary, because the world can serve as ‘its own best representation’ (Brooks 1991), and 
inefficient, because the demands of processing them will create a congested ‘bottleneck’ 
leading to paralysis or unacceptable delays (Clark 1997)15. The denial of preference 
representations here is a by-product of any general rejection of representations, and these often 
occur — as in Brooks — without explicit reference to preferences or utilities. Neither alleged 
problem is decisive here. 
 
It is undoubtedly correct that degrees of freedom can be yoked to discriminators or 
transducers fairly directly, and hence be controlled by processes that are representational only 
according to notions of representation so inclusive as to be suspect. An automobile air-bag 
triggered by an accelerometer need not have any connections with other control systems. 
(Even if we do interpret the signal from accelerometer to air-bag as a representation, it 
                                            
14 I’m persuaded by Nick Shea’s argument that reward prediction errors are meta-representational (Shea 2014). 
And what they meta-represent, reward predictions, are one version of what I’m calling preferences. See §6. (Not 
all preferences need be meta-represented by prediction errors.) 
15 Andy Clark wrote of Brooks that it is ‘conceivable that much of human intelligence is based on similar 
environment-specific tricks and strategies’ (1997, p31). Clark’s (1997) discussion of Brooks is so influential that 
it’s led many to write as though Brooks (1991) includes the expression “representational bottleneck”, which it 
doesn’t. 
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doesn’t encode a value, and isn’t compared with anything else, so isn’t a preference.) Direct 
linking of transduction and activation of this kind can be combined in various ways, including 
some hierarchies, leading to whole agents that have been variously described as ‘subsumption 
architectures’ (Brooks 1991), and ‘detection agents’ (Sterelny 2003). We can think of the 
individual linkings as the parts of ‘layers’, or as ‘detection systems’, or ‘reflexes’, etc. Let’s 
allow that such agents are both possible and actual. The issue is how efficient they are.  
 
While it might be true that the occurrent, local environment can guide behaviour without 
having to be duplicated in a model, what preferences are supposed to represent aren’t facts 
contained in the external environment at all, but rather facts about the needs and priorities of 
the agent itself, and facts about the (net) values of available actions conditional on those 
needs. Even if the world and body can ‘represent themselves’, they won’t automatically 
represent the returns (in what matters to the organism) on actions. 
 
Similarly, the complaints about representational bottlenecks are at their most effective in 
original application, which was cases where courses of action were selected by consulting 
richly detailed world-models, constructed ‘after’ perception, drawing on a stored model, and 
‘before’ action was executed. But the value representations that preferences consist of just 
aren’t ‘world models’ in that sense at all. They can be very sparse representationally speaking - 
either consisting of an additional layer or component of the existing motor or sensorimotor 
resources used to control an action, or monitor a metabolic need or state. Here is an empirical 
example: neuroeconomic research detected neural correlates of relative expected return from 
choices expressed through eye movements in the motor circuits producing the eye movements 
themselves (Platt & Glimcher 1999, Dorris & Glimcher 2004, Glimcher 2011). Eye 
movements were selected for this research partly because the relationship between neural 
activity and produced movement is comparatively simple and tractable (when the head is held 
stationary). It had been known since Shadlen & Newsome (1996) that activity levels in LIP 
neurons predict impending saccades. What this research showed was that the differing levels 
of neural activity for two mutually exclusive actions, prior to one being produced, stood in a 
regular relationship to the varying returns on each action. The only ‘bottleneck’ here is the 
Sherringtonian final common path blocking mechanically inconsistent eye movements, and 
the processing of preferences actually exploits it. Preferences, then, needn’t generally involve 
additional bottlenecks, or impose an excessive representational burden. While the world might 
‘represent’ the saccadic targets well enough, it won’t itself represent the varying consequences 
of selection relative to the appetite of the animal. 
 
This won’t satisfy everyone. Producing and processing preferences still isn’t free, and might be 
prohibitively expensive, at least compared to some alternative. A leading general idea, 
embracing several variants, about what to do instead, is for behaviours, activities or goals to 
be arranged in some kind of hierarchy of trumping relationships that don’t depend on 
encoding values. What ‘subsumption architecture’ originally meant, recall, was that under 
certain conditions the activity of one ‘layer’ of a control system would simply over-ride 
(‘subsume’) that of another. A natural example is provided by sea-slugs, that are indiscriminate 
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omnivores and would eat the eggs that they had laid themselves if it wasn’t that during egg-
laying they released a hormone that inhibited eating behaviour (Davis, et al 1977). The value of 
eating their own eggs isn’t represented as low or negative. The one behaviour simply suppresses 
the other. 
 
Sterelny (2003) has argued that in most creatures there’s no need for the development of 
preference states because internal environments will tend to be ‘transparent’ in the sense of 
being characterised by highly reliable signals, unlike external environments which are prone to 
pollution from the conflicting interests of other organisms. In these transparent internal 
environments, he suggests, some kind of relatively fixed motivational hierarchy, perhaps of 
‘drives’, can be a sufficiently effective mechanism of action selection. As noted in (§1) Sterelny 
is partly talking about a somewhat different topic to me, even though he sometimes uses the 
term ‘preferences’, since the project in his (2003) is to develop a plausible natural history of 
cognitive states approximately corresponding to folk-psychological beliefs and desires. The 
goal-representing proto-desire states he’s concerned with are fit partners for proto-beliefs, 
perhaps enjoying some degree of accessibility to the agent that has them. Preferences in the 
sense at issue here are more modest states. That said, let me address the two lines of argument 
in Sterelny (2003). 
 
First, as noted in (§3), while it may be approximately true that internal environments contain 
less hostility than external ones, it doesn’t follow that tracking the needs of an organism is a 
trivial or simple matter, let alone that the state of the organism can be treated as ‘its own best 
representation’. The needs of an organism vary in many dimensions, including over various 
time-scales, may involve quantities that aren’t or can’t be tracked in any way that is both cheap 
and reliable, and can vary in their urgency, either because of their own values or in interaction 
with other factors.16 The needs of an organism can be many-dimensional, independently 
varying, and opaque. 
 
Second, it is possible that the view defended here and Sterelny’s is more compatible (in some 
respects) that may superficially appear. If ‘drives’ represent the strength of needs, or the 
strength of motivation for certain behaviours, then they’re doing the same general thing that 
I’m saying preferences do, and we’re just using different terms for (at least roughly) the same 
target. I’d like to think that is at least partly true, and that the appearance of disagreement is 
because Sterelny is using ‘preference’ some of the time as a stylistic variant for desire-like 
state, and aiming to provide a natural history of cognitive capacities approximately like folk-
psychological beliefs and desires, where a key part of what desires do is represent goals. Sub-
personally representing values of action-state pairings, though, needn’t involve representing 
goals. 
 
                                            
16 McFarland & Sibly (1975) has an instructive discussion of the challenges of constructing an idealised 
‘command space’ representing the behavioural relevance of the changing needs of an organism (see also Houston 
& McFarland 1981). 
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Matters are complicated because drive talk is far from univocal, the term having been used to 
name various theoretical constructs in motivational psychology, most of which have been 
superseded and displaced by reward-based concepts more compatible with preferences 
(Berridge 2004). Not only that, behavioural ecologists sometimes use drive talk in ways that 
are agnostic about cognitive mechanism, referring to variation in the tendency to behave in 
some way. Sterelny doesn’t explicitly endorse any of the models of drives that were rejected 
along the way. Still, he’s undoubtedly suggesting that a lot could be achieved in behaviour 
selection by means of motivational states more modest than desires, which includes that they 
don’t represent goals, but may represent urgency or strength of motivation in some way 
integrating bodily needs and detected opportunities. Subject to keeping a close eye on what 
words we use when, I don’t think we’re substantially at odds here. 
 
This leaves one outstanding matter: Sterelny’s explicit endorsement of an idea of ‘fixed 
motivational hierarchies’, which I take to mean that some needs or priorities can — under 
specific conditions — ‘trump’ others in ways that circumvent any need for representations of 
their relative values to be processed. The proposal here is a version of the family of views — 
already noted — including subsumption architectures and other non-representational 
trumping hierarchies. And it is undoubtedly true that complicated organisational matters of 
various kinds can be made simpler and more tractable by switching between distinct ‘modes’ 
of activity within which a sub-set of the total behavioural options are in play, and the mix of 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ information gathering is tailored to the current mode. Not only that, 
many animals arguably do something like this - switching between territory-defending mode, 
mate competition mode, etc. 
 
This doesn’t dissolve the argument for preferences for several reasons. First, preferences have 
a role to play within modes. Consider an animal in foraging mode. Its options have varying 
consequences, even if its sole aim is chasing some superficially simple target such as net rate 
of calorie intake. Herring gulls exhibit preferences over which eggs to brood, and are sensitive 
to dimensions including size, shape, position, colour, visual texture (Baerends & Kruijt 1971, 
McFarland & Sibly 1975). Second, having a set of modes means having the problem of when 
to be in which. The question of whether or not to switch mode — say from foraging to 
dealing with a threat — is itself an economic problem, involving costs and benefits. 
Preferences could have a role mediating between modes. Finally, fixed motivational hierarchies 
have the property that they ‘leave money on the table’. That is, at least if ‘fixed’ is interpreted 
to mean exhibiting — which may not involve representing — a lexical preference.17 If any 
amount of some good, no matter how small, is worth more to you than any amount of 
another, no matter how large, you’re unable to make trade-offs, or secure available marginal 
returns. Lexical ordering might make some hard choices more tractable, but it carries a cost. 
 
                                            
17 In Rawls (1971) a lexical ordering is a strict ranking, where one criterion (in his case a principle of justice) has 
to be completely satisfied before another can be applied at all. ( 
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I’ve been saying that preferences represent values. The right way to think of this, is that they 
represent a kind of subjective utility, which is to say a value that is abstract compared to any of 
the specific modalities of both cost and return which matter to the agent. It might seem as 
though there’s one more way of resisting my position, or diluting it, which is to say that 
something less abstract could serve as the ‘common currency’ here, for example calories. This 
line of thinking might be encouraged by the influence of models of foraging behaviour, in 
which net rate of calorie intake feature prominently. But the point doesn’t generalise. The 
reason for this is that there isn’t one concrete quantity that is generally the salient limiting 
resource that determines what allocation of means is efficient. Sometimes it is calories, 
sometimes it is hydration or some other specific nutrient, sometimes it might be time, or 
something else entirely. The limiting resource when people who aren’t poor buy groceries is 
more likely to be time than money. (See McFarland & Bösser 1993: pp48-49) More generally, 
the opportunity cost, composed of the varied costs and returns of actions foregone, provides 
the right standard of comparison. So to do their work well, preferences have to be ‘in’ a 
quantity more abstract than any of the dimensions in which choices can vary, some of which 
don’t feature in all options, i.e. utility. 
 
The upshot of the preceding discussion, I argue, is that no decisive objection to the ERP has 
been found, although various good reasons to qualify or refine it have. The following 
formulation is the result: 
 
(ERP2a) Preferences enable efficient action selection for degrees of freedom with alternative 
uses in non-transparent environments. 
(ERP2b) Preferences will be selected when the gains outweigh the costs, and design options 
are accessible to selection. 
The stipulation about degrees of freedom with alternative uses exempts truly single-use 
capacities the control of which can be entirely independent of any other control system (the 
biological equivalent of an air-bag). The restriction to non-transparent environments (in the 
sense used in Sterelny 2003) is to allow that in an environment where behaviour could be 
efficient while being entirely cue-bound, perhaps preferences would have no work to do 
(especially if the demands of internal environments are set aside).  
 
Thus far I’ve not discussed preferences in relation to learning. This is deliberate. The benefits 
of preferences — in efficient allocation of behavioural capacities — could in principle be 
realised in an agent incapable of learning. This would be analogous to a reinforcement 
learning system tuned by ‘evolutionary methods’ (Sutton & Barto 1998). Although such a 
system might solve a ‘reinforcement learning problem’ the individual system itself does no 
learning, but its properties are found by comparing the success levels of many variant systems. 
Such a system would still, in the language of reinforcement learning, have a ‘policy’ that 
matched states to actions, and ranked multiple available actions, which is close enough to 
having preferences. I don’t know if any real biological agents have this property - of having 
some kind of preference implementation while themselves lacking the capacity to learn. On 
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the other hand, at least some important kinds of learning, in particular operant or reward-
based learning, are impossible without preferences. Reward-based learning involves tuning the 
agent’s tendencies to perform various actions on the basis of the history of the consequences 
of performing them in various conditions. This is very explicit in the computational literature: 
the ‘policy’ is associated with expected rewards, and the behaviours associated with actual 
rewards, which are compared in various ways, so that — when there is a mis-match — the 
policy can be updated. And the rewards are quantitative signals. To the extent that living 
systems approximate this kind of functionality, signals encoding expected rewards, and actual 
rewards, and capable of comparing them (preferences) must be implemented somehow. 
 
The ERP as defended here seems to imply that selection will drive some organisms (where the 
gains outweigh the cost, and where the design of the agent includes multi-use degrees of 
freedom, etc.) towards consistently tracking the costs and returns of actions and 
environmental states in a highly efficient way. But we know very well that living agents mostly 
don’t do this, and behavioural economics and behavioural psychology have produced a long 
catalogue of systematic deviations from strict economic efficiency, as well as a few candidate 
general theories under which most of the deviations turn out to be special cases. (e.g. 
Kahneman & Tvesky 1979, Ainslie 2017). Whatever general theory, if any, is correct, a part of 
the explanatory story about the deviations will likely concern design and computational 
constraints. In the following section I briefly outline a few that seem especially important, and 
that can be expected to result in real preference implementations being compromised in 
various ways. 
 
5. Design Constraints and Trade-offs 
 
One response to the ways in which living agents apparently deviate from the norms of 
efficient agency (sometimes called ‘rationality’) is to argue either that there’s something wrong 
with the data, perhaps because it was acquired in contexts that were ecologically bizarre, or 
that we’re mistaken about what the rights norms of efficient agency are. Okasha, for example, 
critically discusses several ingenious responses to the phenomenon of intransitive choice, 
involving scenarios in which it is arguably optimal to violate transitivity including by exhibiting 
inter-temporal inconsistency (Okasha 2018, pp185f). Okasha’s approach focuses on 
comparing the predictions and consequences of theories of fitness optimising behaviour and 
rational choice, largely independent of considerations of cognitive implementation. That isn’t 
the approach I take here. I’ve defended a prediction about cognitive design innovation in the 
history of living organisms. Consequently specifically cognitive design factors, insofar as they 
bear on the implementation of preferences, are directly relevant. I emphasise three broad 
groups of factors. 
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The first is efficient coding. As noted in passing above in connection with the responses of salt 
receptors (§3), psychophysical processes aren’t consistently perfect. More generally the neural 
encoding of physical facts doesn’t ‘attempt’ to represent objective magnitudes, but rather 
compresses transduced variation into a baseline-dependent encoding, where the baseline itself 
is variable (Barlow, 1961). Even before the encoding, the processes of transduction 
themselves abandon information about objective magnitudes. Retinal cells, for example, 
respond relative to a transient average intensity (Burns & Baylor 2001). Measures like this are a 
pretty good way of making effective use of communication channels with fixed and often low 
bandwidth, and are found in psychophysical processes quite generally. If the most raw data 
about magnitudes in the world has this property, then — barring the action of some 
specialised system of correction and recalibration18 — any represented magnitude that 
combines, integrates or compares those will inherit that property, and perhaps repeat the 
‘efficient coding’ leading to further deviations from tracking of objective magnitudes. There is 
no reason to suppose that representations of value would be immune to this process, and 
some evidence that it exhibits it (e.g. Tremblay & Schultz 1999; Tobler, Fiorillo & Schultz 
2005). Not only that, if we suppose that they exhibit it, then we find plausible explanations for 
several well-documented deviations from norms of efficiency. Among these are the specific 
inter-temporal inconsistency observed in many living organisms, sometimes referred to as 
their ‘hyperbolic discounting’ of delayed rewards (e.g. Gibbon 1977). If delays are ‘efficiently’ 
encoded in the psychophysical sense, then the ranking of options at different delays may fail 
to remain stable in the absence of new information. Another is the effect of irrelevant 
alternatives, since efficient coding including additional low-value options reduces the 
represented difference between others (Glimcher 2011, p242f). 
 
The second is also related to efficiency, and concerns chunking and hierarchies. Bandwidth and 
processing constraints often favour ‘chunking’ and simplifying heuristics including decisions 
by ‘trumping’. Chunking refers to grouping several things together to reduce the number of 
options that have to be dealt with (Miller 1956). In a decision case this might involve selecting 
first between, say, foraging and resting, and only after that selecting between different foraging 
actions. Switching between categories needn’t involve comparison of any, let alone all, of the 
sub-elements of each. So, for example, switching from foraging to flight (because of predation 
risk) might be handled by a process that simply invokes flight behaviour when the detected 
                                            
18 Trained experts in highly scaffolded environments (including systems of financial mathematics and computers) 
can, for example, far more closely approximate economic rationality than lone living agents. (Conversely some 
environment, like shopping malls, are densely scaffolded to exploit unwary agents.) 
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risk passes some threshold, and remaining in flight mode until some later discrimination of 
sufficient safety. As argued above, these transitions needn’t be devoid of sensitivity to 
economic factors: very hungry animals often tolerate foraging risks that more sated individuals 
would avoid. But this sensitivity doesn’t establish that a single system of preferences is being 
applied to every alternative behaviour that is is in play. A patchwork of incomplete and 
variously chunked comparisons might be the most that time and specifically cognitive 
capacities allow. In addition, some behaviours might be sufficiently urgent or important that it 
makes evolutionary sense to make their execution under certain conditions effectively 
unconditional, or reflex. The basic initial actions required of dependant infants to secure 
nutrition might fall into this category. Doing anything else would be a terrible way of getting 
the export-explore trade-off wrong! If they are, then those allocations may bypass evaluation 
against available alternatives entirely. 
 
Third, and finally, is distributed and embodied cognition. In (§4) I had reason to reject some of the 
more radical claims made on behalf of embodied or situated cognition. But this rejection was 
quite narrow in scope, limited to defending some kinds of bottlenecks, and one specific kind 
of representation. Not only that, the argument in favour of preferences made above is prima 
facie consistent with the idea that the implementation or representation of preferences — like 
all cognition — is a distinct stage in between sensation and action. That is to say, the 
argument for preferences might seem encourage a centralised and disembodied conception of 
cognition. I count myself among those who are pretty sure that this is not the right general 
picture of natural cognition, or a particularly helpful model for much artificial cognition. Real 
brains exhibit considerable parallelism in their architecture, fail strictly to segregate sensory 
from motor processes, and operate with ’incomplete’ encodings that take for granted — and 
cannot function without — aspects of the structure of the bodies they control or sense with, 
or the environments in which they live. In addition many processes operate in quick and dirty 
ways, often not engaging in much communication with other systems. This picture is not at all 
to congenial to the idea of a single, central register of preferences against which available 
courses of action and their possible consequences (whether or not ‘chunked’ in line with the 
preceding paragraph) are judged. It is more plausible that preference implementation is widely 
distributed, with cues and candidate actions having preference relevant processing early, and 
with evaluation distributed and duplicated in various ways.19 One neurally specific model of 
                                            
19 Attentional processes, for example, would be quicker if they had their own local, perhaps abbreviated or 
simplified, ‘copies’ of the preferences instead of having to consult head office. Redundancy brings risks of 
DRAFT VERSION – COMMENTS WELCOME 
19 
this is Cisek’s ‘Affordance Competition Hypothesis’ (Cisek 2007). Cisek rejects ‘classical 
sandwich’ models of cognition (the term is due to Hurley 1998), proposing that “the processes 
of action selection and specification occur simultaneously” (2007, p1586) and argues that 
sensory information selectively informs the generation of multiple incompletely specified 
behaviours, which may be released into execution prior to full specification. Reading his 
account of parallel, incomplete, competing behaviour specification processes with Dennett in 
mind, it is tempting to call it a ‘multiple drafts’ model of affordance competition: “From this 
perspective, behaviour is viewed as a constant competition between internal representations 
of the potential actions which Gibson (1979)  termed ‘affordances’” (Cisek 2007, p1586). My 
point here doesn’t depend on endorsing Cisek’s specific, though promising and interesting, 
proposal. What matters is that preference functionality does not depend on clear segregation 
of input and output, or serial ordering of decision processes. It is more likely that preference 
implementation is pervasive and interleaved in all processes from sensory transduction to 
activation of degrees of freedom 
 
Together these suggest that in natural agents the implementation of preferences, when found, 
will be objectively inaccurate because of efficient coding, sometimes subject to chunking and 
other simplifications, sometimes bypassed entirely, and distributed around the brain in ways 
that introduce additional scope for volatility and even conflict. Because of the cognitive costs 
of implementing preferences, they may be found in ways that are limited in scope - for 
example an omnivorous creature with an otherwise simple lifestyle might have relatively fine-
grained ranking of food types, accompanied by less flexible and cost-sensitive systems 
selecting between foraging and other behaviours. What real preferences have to do is 
represent, accurately enough, the returns on available behaviours so that (often enough) better 
one can be selected than would be otherwise. Like any cognitive system, they’re expensive, 
and additional increments of accuracy drive up the expense. This is, furthermore, what we 
find in nature, as I argue below. 
 
6. Preferences and Real Brains 
 
Although including occasional real biological illustrations, my argument so far has been 
largely theoretical. One way of seeing it is as a prediction: given certain factors, evolution can 
                                                                                                                                    
conflict, though, such as cases where the abstinent addict still orients towards predictors of the target of their 
addiction. 
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be expected to invent a preference-like capacity. A fair question is whether or not this 
prediction is correct. Here I briefly defend the position that, although the available evidence 
contains substantial gaps, it is correct: Many natural organisms have preferences. 
 
This evidence is perhaps most comprehensive in the case of humans, but I’ll begin with 
monkeys. Final common paths provide a natural architectural or functional ‘place’ for the 
operation of preferences. Circuits specialised for filtering out mechanically incompatible 
actions might allow competition between options that are not ruled out to be expressed. And 
if preferences are to influence allocation, they are the last place for them to do so. Some key 
early experiments in neuroeconomics depended on this very line of thinking to generate 
empirical hypotheses or to interpret their results (e.g. Platt & Glimcher 1999, Dorris & 
Glimcher 2004). As discussed in (§4), Monkey subjects were trained to express choices 
through saccades to different targets. Saccades are a convenient behaviour precisely because 
they’re controlled by small networks of muscles with their own series of neural topographic 
maps, corresponding to a two-dimensional ‘dart board’ of skull-relative fixation targets. These 
maps are, in part, a final common path that prevents the eyes from attempting conflicted 
movements like simultaneously turning up and down. They’re also a bottleneck for 
competition between fixation targets. In the interval preceding choice levels of activity in 
regions of the topographic maps corresponding to the saccadic targets under study varied with 
the expected return on that movement. Platt and Glimcher’s monkeys were ‘paid’ in juice, 
while Dorris and Glimcher’s subjects played an inspection game with returns in water, but in 
both cases local neural activity and (relative) expected subjective utility from the 
corresponding target were correlated. In later work Klein, Deaner and Platt (2008) found that 
activity in neurons specialised for saccades reflected values of both social and fluid rewards, so 
this isn’t merely a fact about saccades for fluid rewards. 
 
This isn’t, furthermore, merely something about monkeys, or restricted to saccadic 
movements. In neuroeonomic study of human choices, correlates of utility are usually sought 
further ‘upstream’ of anatomically detailed final common paths, because electrode recordings 
are rarely used in human neuroeconomic experiments, and choices expressed by button 
presses and other hand movements don’t correspond to somatotopic maps that are as 
conveniently tractable as those for eye movements (Glimcher 2011). Even so, the evidence is 
rather compelling. Levy and Glimcher (2012) survey relevant experimental work up to 2012. 
First they detail studies showing that activity in the ventral striatum was positively associated 
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with, among other things, monetary gains and losses, cumulative monetary rewards, 
anticipation of varying monetary rewards, expected values of uncertain monetary rewards, and 
discounted value of delayed monetary rewards. Second, they consider studies with at least one 
incentive other than money, including consumer goods, gustatory rewards (water, juice, food), 
physical pain, social reputation, again finding consistent correlations. Whether or not Shizgal 
and Conover were correct to say that orderly choice means that there “must” be value 
representations in a common scale, the work of some neuroeconomists suggests that there is 
in fact one for a wide range of choice types. 
 
Comparative neuroeconomics is a small field, but approximately analogous results have been 
found in other vertebrates and some invertebrates with indications that the neural systems 
across phyla share structural similarities, and similar functional roles for dopamine or related 
molecules.20 Capacity for reinforcement learning is diagnostic of having preferences. That is, 
although preferences need not be exploited in learning, reward learning requires both 
sensitivity to rewards and updating behavioural dispositions in light of reward-based 
consequences of earlier behaviour. Besides humans, monkeys, and other widely studied 
chordates (especially rodents and bird) reward sensitivity and capacity for reinforcement 
learning or operant conditioning has been found in insects (including bees, flies, cockroaches 
and ants), crustaceans (crabs, crayfish, lobsters) and cephalopod molluscs (Perry, Baron & 
Cheng 2013). In addition, dopamine or similar molecules play functionally similar roles in 
modulation of behaviour towards reward (Barron, Søvik & Cornish 2010). The fact that in 
some species apparently incapable of reinforcement learning, such as nematodes, dopamine 
plays a role modulating motor activity (Barron, Søvik & Cornish 2010) encourages the 
thought that the earliest steps towards implementing preferences were elaborations of motor 
control systems. That is, that final common paths paying their way in helping with the 
problem of producing behaviour out of capacities for activity provided the initial platform for 
the development of processes prioritising between available behaviours.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
I have argued that psychologically real preference states can play a valuable role in 
prioritising the allocation of the capacities of living agents, and that this plausibly explains 
their evolution. The states I’ve focused on, preferences, are more cognitively modest than 
                                            
20 [I’m working on selecting appropriate additional references for this paragraph.] 
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desires on most accounts of desires. The argument I’ve offered is a version of the 
Environmental Complexity Thesis. Whereas standard expositions of that tend to focus on the 
development of world-representing states, whether understood as decoupled representations, 
or proto-beliefs, I’ve focused primarily on the role of value representations in dealing with the 
problem of matching the capacities of an agent to the changing contingencies of the world 
around it. That problem is often complex, involving mappings from varied capacities to 
action, given changing needs and changing external contingencies, with costs and benefits of 
multiple types and magnitudes. Doing better at dealing with this problem means deploying the 
available behavioural repertoire more effectively. This is an obvious kind of advantage, 
especially if the goals more efficiently achieved are understood in terms of fitness. In an 
unqualified form, the argument suggests something that we don’t find. Real organisms aren’t 
that efficient, and their deviations from efficiency exhibit some patterns. Many of these are the 
result of cognitive design limitations and trade-offs. Real preference implementations are 
compromises. Nonetheless, they are widely - though not universally - found in real organisms 
with nervous systems, and appear to have deep evolutionary roots. 
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